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deaTh and digniTy
Kelton Gardner1

I

n April 2014, Brittany Maynard, a 29-year-old resident of Anaheim, California and recent graduate student of the University
of California, was diagnosed with grade four astrocytoma—a
form of brain cancer—and was given a prognosis of six months
to live. Brittany and her family moved to Oregon, one of only five
states at the time that had legalized physician-assisted suicide. As
the quality of her life decreased dramatically, Brittany decided she
wanted a physician-assisted suicide. This process would consist of
taking prescribed pills (known as barbiturates) in the comfort of her
own home at the time of her own choosing. On November 1, 2014,
Brittany ended her life as she intended. In an article she posted on
CNN’s website, Brittany expressed her gratitude for laws allowing
physician-assisted suicide in circumstances of imminent death and
tremendous pain. In regards to her right to a physician-assisted suicide, she wrote, “Who has the right to tell me that I don’t deserve this
choice? That I deserve to suffer for weeks or months in tremendous
amounts of physical and emotional pain? Why should anyone have
the right to make that choice for me?”2
In May 2014, in an account not nearly as publicized as that of
Brittany Maynard, J.J. Hanson from New Jersey was diagnosed with
the same kind of brain cancer as Brittany, but with a prognosis of
1
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only four months to live—even less than that afforded Brittany. Just
as Brittany attested, J.J. relayed that the illness is “a big burden on
your family and those who are around you.”3 J.J. was told by three
doctors that his disease was incurable, and only after a significant
amount of persistence did he find a doctor willing to treat him.
Twenty months after being told he was going to die (sixteen months
longer than his original prognosis), J.J. posted a YouTube video revealing that he was in remission. Unlike Brittany, J.J. expressed his
disapproval of the legality of a physician-assisted suicide. He commented, “Assisted suicide is a decision that you can’t unmake. My
wife would be without a husband and my son without a father.”4
These examples raise important yet difficult moral questions
regarding the meaning of life and death and the related right to selfdetermination. But perhaps just as important as these questions is
the question of the state’s interest in either promoting or prohibiting the practice of physician-assisted suicide. Does the state have an
interest in allowing citizens the right to a physician-assisted suicide
or is there ample reason to prohibit it? Since the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act was passed in 1997, terminally ill patients like Brittany
(with a prognosis of six months or less to live) now have the option
to a physician-assisted suicide after complying with procedural
requirements.5
This paper does not intend to reason by form of an argument
whose premises support a conclusion based solely on legal precedent. While there are two major Supreme Court cases that have ruled
on the matter of physician-assisted suicide, these cases ruled only on
the constitutionality of an already existing law and did not rule on
the matter of a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide. This
left open the possibility of a future ruling that could either deny or
3
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affirm a universal right to physician-assisted suicide or perhaps shift
the responsibility of deciding to the states. Law, when first written,
is based on moral presumptions, and when precedent is neither clear
nor prevalent both philosophical and moral arguments can and must
be presented to warrant the passing or preventing of a new law. Because there is little precedent regarding physician-assisted suicide,
the arguments I will address consider the moral and philosophical
implications of legalizing physician-assisted suicide as well as court
precedent thus far established. I will likewise address considerations
of autonomy in relation to justifying the practice of euthanasia and
the weight such a principle carries in light of other current legal
doctrine.
In order to identify the flaws of the Death with Dignity Act, I
will first discuss two common arguments generally made in favor of
laws allowing for a physician-assisted suicide. I will show why these
two arguments ultimately fail to justify laws like the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act as currently written. I will then proceed to address
the variety of compelling interests the state has in upholding a ban
on physician-assisted suicide after which I will discuss the negative
social implications of enshrining such a practice in law. I will conclude that Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, and any law that legalizes physician-assisted suicide, should be repealed.

I. DEFINITIONS
Euthanasia is defined as “the practice of intentionally ending a
life in order to relieve pain and suffering.”6 There are typically two
classes of euthanasia: active euthanasia and passive euthanasia. The
difference between the two involves the distinction between killing someone and letting someone die. Active euthanasia generally
implies the practice of directly taking one’s life, whereas passive euthanasia commonly implies the act of “pulling the plug” or failing
to take action to preserve one’s life. A distinction between the two is
used in most contemporary codes of medical ethics (e.g., the American
6
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Medical Association’s Code of Ethics) and is also recognized in the
American tradition of law.7 This distinction is also supported in the
Supreme Court ruling in Vacco v. Quill where the justices “recognized, at least implicitly, the distinction between letting a patient die
and making that patient die.”8
Indispensable to an understanding of the implications of legalizing euthanasia is a familiarity with the terms “voluntary,” “involuntary,” and “nonvoluntary” and their relation to euthanasia. Voluntary
euthanasia is the practice of taking one’s life by deliberate action.
In such cases, “[t]hat the individual explicitly consents to death is
a necessary feature of voluntary euthanasia.”9 Involuntary euthanasia “consists in ending the life of someone contrary to that person’s
wish.”10 In such cases, the person “not only fails to give consent,
but expresses the desire not to be killed.”11 Nonvoluntary euthanasia,
unlike involuntary euthanasia, is when the “person gives no specific
consent or instructions, and the decision [to die] is made by family,
friends, or physicians.”12 While these definitions are not always uniform, they generally provide a basis for understanding the forms of
euthanasia and their relationship with law and public policy.

II. BACKGROUND
The Hippocratic Oath, originating in Ancient Greece, is an
oath that all practitioners of medicine traditionally took upon the
initiation of their medical careers. Although it may differ slightly
from the original version, modern medical doctors continue to use
a contemporary version of the oath, one that is still very similar in
7
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form and context to that of the Grecian form. One particular passage
reads, “I will, according to my ability and judgment, prescribe a
regimen for the health of the sick; but I will utterly reject harm and
mischief.”13 Euthanasia’s compatibility with the Hippocratic Oath is
a controversial topic. When considering the oath, some infer that it
is the doctor’s moral duty to preserve the lives of his patients, therefore aiding in the death of a patient would directly interfere with
this moral obligation. Those who favor euthanasia argue that such
a practice respects the will of the patient and is either compatible
with certain interpretations of the Hippocratic Oath or argue that
the oath should be modified to include the practice of euthanasia as
morally permissible.

III. PROOF OF CLAIM
In 1997 the Supreme Court ruled on two cases regarding physician-assisted suicide. In the first, Washington v. Glucksberg, the
Supreme Court upheld the ban on physician-assisted suicide. It was
ruled that the right to a physician-assisted suicide was “not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”14
Furthermore the court found that the “States may properly decline
to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy.”15 The statute was also legally justified by the
state’s interest in “protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession,”16 and in “protecting vulnerable groups—including
the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons from abuse, neglect, and
mistakes.”17 While this decision upheld a ban on physician-assisted
13
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suicide, it did so “without expressly condoning or disapproving of assisted suicide in general,”18 leaving the door open for other states to enact laws that might allow for physician-assisted suicide if they choose.
The second notable case regarding physician-assisted suicide
determined by the Supreme Court in 1997, Vacco v. Quill, regarded
a New York state statute including in its definition of manslaughter
“to intentionally cause or aid another to commit suicide.”19 The court
ruled that there is “no constitutional right to commit suicide.”20 Petitioners argued that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
because New York allowed for “a competent person to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment, which refusal was tantamount to physician-assisted suicide.”21 Despite current philosophical debate over
the possibility of any moral distinction between “killing” and “letting die,” the court ruled, “There was a difference between allowing
a disease to take its natural course and intentionally using an artificial means to produce death.”22 According to Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, the state of New York also has an interest “in preserving
life and in protecting vulnerable persons,”23 but the “resolution of
this issue was left to the normal democratic processes within the
State.”24 Similar to the ruling in Washington v. Glucksberg, the court
left open the possibility to the states, through democratic process,
to enact laws of their choosing on the matter of physician-assisted
suicide but they did not define physician-assisted suicide as being a
constitutional right.

18
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A. Autonomy
In his article “When Self-Determination Runs Amok,” Dr.
Daniel Callahan confronts two prevalent arguments that serve as a
basis for allowing euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. These
two values are self-determination (the right to autonomy) and mercy.
When these two values are separated, “assisted suicide for any reason and nonvoluntary euthanasia for the incompetent will become
acceptable.”25 In order to understand Callahan’s arguments and how
they relate to legal precedent, I will discuss the value of each one.
First, a prominent argument for physician-assisted suicide is based
on the principle of individual autonomy. I will use “individual autonomy” and “self-determination” synonymously when referencing
the ability to exercise agency. When a physician-assisted suicide is
based on the principle of one’s right to self-determination, we find
that some laws, such as the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, arbitrarily deny certain persons the right to a physician-assisted suicide;
the very right that the law originally set out to protect.
For example, John is a 75-year-old man who is diagnosed with
a terminal illness that will result in death within three months. His
pain is minimal with treatment but he decides that it is “unbearable”
enough to think his life is no longer worth living. As long as he complies with the procedural processes26 of the Oregon statute, John will
have his wishes respected. George, on the other hand, is a 75-yearold man who is diagnosed with a terminal illness, longer lasting and
more degenerative in nature than John’s, which will result in death
within eighteen months and likely no less than twelve months without treatment. With or without treatment, George is predicted to suffer tremendous amounts of pain. He already considers his pain to be
unbearable and wishes to end his life peacefully and painlessly, but
under Oregon statute George is precluded from doing so because he
is estimated to have more than six months to live.

25
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Considering this example, can one say that it is fair to respect
John’s autonomy and not George’s? Why is John’s autonomy more
deserving of respect than George’s? It appears completely arbitrary
to deny certain people the right to their autonomy and not deny others, especially when that “right” seems to be respected only when
based on a subjective timeframe. Further applying the principle of
autonomy, it would be unfair logically to assume that the right to
self-determination exists only under certain circumstances such as
a terminal illness or a crippling accident, rather than as an inherent
right possessed by all. If individual autonomy is the determining
factor for physician-assisted suicide, then the lovelorn teenager who
wishes to end his or her life must also be granted the ability to do so.
As Callahan asks concerning those who would be denied the decision to die, “Whatever the person’s motives may be, why are they not
sufficient?”27 Those who say that limiting self-determination in certain circumstances is justified must show why those circumstances
make that particular person’s autonomy of more worth or respectability than another’s without being arbitrary or inconsistent.
B. Mercy
The second value discussed by Callahan is mercy. Many who
advocate for policies allowing physician-assisted suicide base them
on the principle of “mercy” in order to relieve suffering. Intuitively
it seems unfair to allow someone to suffer a tremendous amount of
pain if the option to end his or her life is available. However, if we
put aside the right to self-determination and consider the justification of euthanasia solely on the grounds of a right to the relief of
suffering then we run into a similar problem of applying the principle consistently. Callahan invites us to consider the person “who is
suffering but not competent, who is perhaps demented or mentally
retarded.”28 Most who favor physician-assisted suicide would deny
that such persons qualify for euthanasia. But why is that the case?
Callahan continues, “[I]f a person is suffering but not competent,
27
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then it would seem grossly unfair to deny relief solely on the grounds
of incompetence.”29 If relief of suffering is the principle upon which
we justify euthanasia, then it follows that any who are suffering are
entitled to relief, not just those who are competent. This would ultimately justify nonvoluntary euthanasia for the incompetent, a practice that very few, if any, would condone.
One might argue that a combination of these two values, mercy
and self-determination, is where the true and consistent justification for euthanasia lies. In considering the possibility of combining
these two discussed values, as Callahan notices, “It is said that a
competent, adult person should have a right to euthanasia for the
relief of suffering.”30 But if it is true that an adult person should have
such a right, Callahan continues, “why must the person be suffering? Does not that stipulation already compromise the principle of
self-determination?”31 As Callahan argues, the combination of the
two values of self-determination and mercy lead us back to the same
problem faced in justifying euthanasia solely on self-determination.
Why must suffering be a necessary condition for respecting one’s
autonomy? Thus, it must be the case that we either deny everyone
the right to a physician-assisted suicide or we permit it to all who
so choose regardless of circumstances. Otherwise, it is not logically
consistent in its application to afford an inherent human right to all
who qualify as autonomous human beings. Because most who favor
euthanasia do not support a unilateral right to a physician-assisted
suicide, as this would certainly prejudice the elderly and the mentally ill and encourage suicide in general, we conclude that we must
not allow euthanasia at all.
C. Constitutional Claims
In Lawrence v. Texas, we see a focus on the relationship between
the principle of autonomy and how it relates to the way individuals
choose to direct their lives. In this case the court ruled that a Texas
29
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statute that banned homosexual sodomy between consenting adults
was unconstitutional.32 Justice Kennedy, who delivered the majority
opinion of the court, referred to Griswold v. Connecticut as precedent
for a “right to privacy” not necessarily explicit but certainly implicit
in the Constitution. Griswold v. Connecticut ruled that a state ban
on contraceptives was unconstitutional in light of a couple’s right
to privacy.33 Consequently, in Lawrence v. Texas Kennedy claimed,
“[I]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”34 At the beginning of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, he discusses the value of liberty, which is
an idea that “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”35 If precedent from cases such as Lawrence v. Texas and Griswold v. Connecticut grants a right to privacy and protection from government
intrusion in matters that “deal with belief, expression and certain
intimate conduct,”36 then certainly the intimate choice of when and
how to die should be just as protected if not more so under such legal principles. Privacy, as related to physician-assisted suicide, must
be everyone’s right or nobody’s, otherwise it is inconsistent. Most
people would disagree with granting anyone the right to a physicianassisted suicide for any given reason. Thus we must eliminate physician-assisted suicide completely to be legally consistent with the law
as it stands in light of the principles of privacy.
The Obergefell v. Hodges case justified a right to same-sex marriage under the Equal Protection Clause based on a myriad of reasons
including the personal and intimate nature of the choice regarding
32
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whom to marry. The court argued that such a right should be afforded to same-sex couples because “decisions about marriage are
among the most intimate that an individual can make.”37 If it is the
case that such a decision justifies an equal protection claim, then the
same standard must apply in the case of physician-assisted suicide.
Certainly the right to choose when and how to die is a decision not
only of great intimate and personal worth but one that deals with the
essence of life itself. If choosing whom to marry is personal enough
to warrant a fundamental right to all adults regardless of gender,
then we must treat all similar cases alike. A case that involves an
intimate and personal choice similar to that of marriage, such as
choosing when to die, must also be allowed to all adults regardless of
circumstance. Therefore, if we allow a physician-assisted suicide in
only some cases, by the precedent set forth in Obergefell v. Hodges,
we must be ready to allow it in all cases of adulthood for any reason.
Once again, most people would not agree with granting any adult
the right to a physician-assisted suicide for any reason whatsoever.
Thus we must eliminate physician-assisted suicide completely to be
legally consistent with the law as it stands in light of equal protection
principles.
If the right to privacy, along with other rights protected under the
Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses, legally justify samesex marriage, abortion, the use of contraceptives, and homosexual
sodomy among consenting adults, then it seems grossly unfair to
allow a state to ban physician-assisted for any reason. A citizen in
one state who is not legally entitled to a physician-assisted suicide,
and who does not have the financial resources to move where it is
legal, has a strong if not legally sound argument under the Equal
Protection Clause, Due Process Clause and the right to privacy for
legalizing physician-assisted suicide in all states for adults and their
consenting doctors.
Understanding the principles behind the defense for euthanasia
allows us to examine pro-euthanasia laws as they stand and determine whether they are beneficial in their enactment or whether their
negative aspects justify their repeal. Perhaps analyzing the statistics
37

Obergefell v. Hodges 83 U.S. Syllabus (2015).

BYU Prelaw review, vol. 31, 2017

12

compiled following the law’s enactment can allow us to ascertain
its justifiability. In 2015, out of the 218 citizens of Oregon who were
prescribed a barbiturate to kill themselves, only 132 were actually reported to have died by the same.38 Likewise, when surveyed,
92.4% of these patients did not profess to be petitioning for their prescription because of conditions of tremendous pain or suffering, but
rather because they were suffering a “loss of autonomy” as cited by
Oregon’s formal statistical report for the Death with Dignity Act.39
This suggests that although suffering is a plausible reason for why
some may want a physician-assisted suicide, the more prevalent reason is self-determination or the right to choose when and how to end
one’s life. If this is true, then the law is arbitrary in its distinction of
persons qualified for the right to that choice.
For example, Jack is a 26-year-old man who was divorced four
years ago. He does not suffer clinical depression but has been discontent with his life ever since his divorce. He has felt the desire to
end his life but has never wanted to do so in a manner that would
burden others. He does not want to cause any pain to his family or
society and prefers to end his life in the quiet of his home as painlessly as possible. He lives in Oregon where physician-assisted suicide is legal but only for those with a terminal illness. He decides
to file suit against the state of Oregon on an equal protection claim
basis. He argues that it is unfair that only those with terminal illnesses have the right to choose when to end their lives while he does
not. He argues that his mental anguish is just as painful to him as is
the physical pain of those with terminal diseases. Because his life is
his, he feels that he should be able to end it when he chooses. If the
Oregon statute allows some a right to choose how and when to end
their lives, then it must recognize John’s right do the same in order to
avoid an inconsistent application of this fundamental choice.
How could the court deny Jack’s request and remain consistent without striking down the currently arbitrary law in Oregon?
38
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In Washington v. Glucksberg, respondents argued that “[t]he decision of how and when to die is one of the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, a choice central to
personal dignity and autonomy.”40 Although the court upheld a ban
on physician-assisted suicide, the arguments made by respondents
have held a lot of weight in light of recent court decisions such as
Obergefell v. Hodges. The Obergefell case ruled that gay marriage
is a fundamental right supported by constitutional interpretation and
was justified partially by the Due Process Clause. This clause protects liberties that “extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining
personal identity and beliefs.”41 At the federal level, abortion and the
right to a same-sex marriage are both considered choices immune
to regulation by the state. If such choices are fundamentally each
individual’s to make, then it seems grossly unfair to deny someone
the right to choose how and when to die regardless of why that might
be. Legally speaking, if we do not question why someone wants to
marry a person of the same gender, or why a woman wants to have
an abortion but we allow either one for the sake of it being an intimate choice, then why must we question the reasons a person might
have in choosing how and when to die?
As it stands, the law in Oregon is arbitrary in its designation
of which classes of persons qualify as having an inherent right to
choose how and when to end their lives. In the Oregon statute, “terminal disease” is defined as “an incurable and irreversible disease
that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months.”42 Even defining
such a term, as we have seen, unfairly precludes those who do not
have a terminal disease or who have one with a longer and possibly
more painful prognosis. As Dr. Callahan argues, “A requirement that
a medical condition be ‘terminal’ will run aground on the notorious

40
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difficulties of knowing when an illness is actually terminal.”43 As
was the case with J.J., his terminal disease was not actually terminal, nor was his prognosis of four months correct. Even in the case
of Brittany Maynard, her prognosis of six months was incorrect because she lived longer than expected. We also do not know with
absolute certainty whether or not the cancer would have taken her
because in the end a self-administered barbiturate was the actual
cause of death.
D. The State’s Interest
Apart from the ambiguity and apparent lack of fairness in regard
to current physician-assisted suicide laws, there are social and practical implications of legalizing physician-assisted suicide and the
question of whether or not the state has compelling interests in upholding a ban on physician-assisted suicide. The state cannot in any
situation give a compelling interest for the approval and legalization
of physician-assisted suicide in light of the consequences of doing
so. Granted, there are costs and benefits of both propositions in regards to legalizing physician-assisted suicide. However, the costs of
legalizing such a practice outweigh the benefits, whereas the benefits
of prohibiting its practice outweigh the costs.
First, we must consider the interests the state has in upholding
a ban on physician-assisted suicide as recognized by the courts, and
then we can consider the consequences of legalizing its practice. In
Washington v. Glucksberg, the court ruled that the state of Washington “had an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life, an
interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession, protecting medical groups, and an interest in preventing the path to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia.”44 According to the court, the state’s
interest in preserving human life outweighs any alleged right to a
physician-assisted suicide, a right which the court went so far as to
say is not a “due process right”45 at all. Likewise, the court found the
43
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interest of “protecting the integrity of the medical profession”46 to be
a compelling state interest as well in upholding a ban on physicianassisted suicide. Because the Hippocratic Oath professes the duties
of medical doctors to be primarily, if not entirely, concerned with
promoting health and preventing sickness, it seems as though aiding
a patient in dying directly contradicts the social role doctors have
had for centuries. Should physician-assisted suicide be legalized, it
would grant doctors the option to simply suggest physician-assisted
suicide to a patient on whom they have given up. This could very
well lead to the pressuring of the elderly, either by doctors or family members, to have a physician-assisted suicide which would be
very similar, if not lead directly to, nonvoluntary and involuntary
euthanasia. Even the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of a
slide towards euthanasia as an interest among many others that were
all “valid and important public interests, which satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational
relation to some legitimate end.”47
Supreme Court case Vacco v. Quill likewise articulated several
state interests in upholding a ban on physician-assisted suicide. According to the holding of the court these interests included but were
not limited to: “prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life;
preventing suicide; maintaining physicians’ roles as their patients’
healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice,
and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and
avoiding a possible slide toward euthanasia.”48 Once again, the court
recognized the possibility of a slide towards euthanasia, most likely
referring to involuntary or nonvoluntary euthanasia, and cited the legalization of physician-assisted suicide being what would potentially
lead to such immoral practices. Whenever the state denies certain
rights that are alleged to be constitutional or fundamental, the state
must provide rational reasons for doing so in order for the ban to be
considered tenable or constitutional. In this case the court considered
these particular interests in upholding the ban on physician-assisted
46
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suicide as “valid and important public interests that easily satisfied
the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a
rational relation to some legitimate end.”49
The argument against physician-assisted suicide that claims it
will lead to involuntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia, the corruption of the medical profession or the pressuring of certain persons to
kill themselves with the aid of a physician, is not merely a slippery
slope fallacy. These are consequential concerns that even the Supreme Court deemed worthy to constitute a state ban on the practice
of physician-assisted suicide. Proof that drastic change in law and
its application can occur in short periods of time is evidenced in the
same-sex marriage movement. In 2003, just fourteen years ago, it
was considered a crime to engage in homosexual sodomy in thirteen
states. With the recent ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges that reached
the Supreme Court in 2015, the right to marry someone regardless
of gender is now considered a fundamental and constitutional right.
Without placing any value judgment on this new right, it becomes
quite clear that drastic change can occur quickly, so it is illogical
to dismiss the potential consequences of allowing something like
physician-assisted suicide as a slippery slope appeal and brush it off
without considering its true implications.
The possibilities of what legalizing physician-assisted suicide
can lead to are quite apparent in the Netherlands, a country that legalized physician-assisted suicide in 2002. As current laws stand,
children are now allowed to have a physician-assisted suicide with
the consent and aid of their parents.50 Although currently not a law,
on the upcoming ballot for next term voting in the Netherlands there
is a bill that would allow for the elderly to end their lives with a
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physician-assisted suicide without proof of any terminal illness.51 If
the elderly citizen is lonely or deems life too burdensome he or she
will be allowed to have a physician-assisted suicide. The fact that
this proposed bill has no minimum age requirement will allow for
virtually anyone to have a physician-assisted suicide for any reason
at all, as long as his or her subjective considerations conform to the
belief that life is no longer worth living. Of course, this is merely a
proposed bill and could be struck down, but this is strong evidence
that physician-assisted suicide is not something that will stop at allowing only those with a terminal illness (and with six months to
live) the right to end their own lives. Clearly, it has the potential to
go further.
Suicide is already considered an epidemic in American society,
so what effect would the government putting its stamp of approval
on the practice of euthanasia have on an already-persistent problem?
If the practice of physician-assisted suicide is pushed to its logical
limits, then why is there any reason to prevent attempts at suicide
if the agent is choosing to do so? Self-determination is the driving
principle behind the practice of physician-assisted suicide, and the
law can only make unjust distinctions in not recognizing the autonomy of everyone by allowing only terminally ill patients the right to
end their lives at the time of their choosing. Either the law must be
changed to deny certain persons a fundamental right, which would
be detrimental to society, or we must not allow anyone the right to a
physician-assisted suicide. Nevertheless, just because medicine has
the means to allow someone a painless death does not mean that the
medical profession is somehow obligated to prescribe death or assist
in its administration. If it is true that we all have a right to choose
when to die, then we certainly can do so whenever we want with
whatever means we so choose. But forcing the medical profession to
recognize this right and putting the government’s stamp of approval on
51
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it will be wholly detrimental to public health in general and threaten
the lives of the old, poor, and vulnerable.

IV. CONCLUSION
Upholding a ban on the practice of physician-assisted suicide
would have negative implications of its own. People might have to
suffer unnecessarily. Or perhaps denying people a right to have a
painless death with the aid of a physician would undermine the value
of autonomy. However, I contend that with the increase in technology
and a focus on palliative and hospice care we can eliminate the high
occurrence of painful deaths. Furthermore, in regards to undermining autonomy, just because the medical profession exists and people
have autonomy does not imply that we ought to morally or even legally require physicians to respect the individual wishes of patients
in this regard. Autonomy is preserved in the fact that people can
end their lives whenever they want with the means they so choose.
Just because medicine might make death easier and more convenient
does not imply that we should coerce doctors to assist a patient in
committing suicide simply because that patient wants to exercise
his or her autonomy. Surely people will always be able to make the
choice to commit suicide at any time they want. Thus, while there
is never a perfect solution in determining whether a particular law
should or should not be enacted, the negative consequences of permitting the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, or any pro physicianassisted suicide law, far outweigh the benefits.
Ultimately, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act is a law that
should be repealed. If its policy considerations are based on a presumption of autonomy then, as the law is written, it arbitrarily denies
certain people a right to choose when to end their lives without compelling justification. It must be expanded to include a significantly
larger group of people, which would have negative social and practical implications especially in regards to the elderly and the mentally
ill. If the law was written based on a principle of a presumed right to
relief of suffering, then nonvoluntary euthanasia for the incompetent
would become acceptable. Furthermore, the state has compelling interests in upholding a ban on physician-assisted suicide including,
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but not limited to preserving human life, protecting the integrity of
the medical profession, and avoiding the path leading to nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia.

